| Why don't all institutions maintain high loan-to-asset ratios to maximize
returns?
By
James B. Eibel, CFA, vice president and marketing representative.
One sure-fire way to increase profitability is to deploy
excess liquidity into loans. On a risk-adjusted basis, loans are superior to securities in
producing returns. All bankers know this. Institutions with high loan-to-asset ratios tend
to have better profitability than institutions with smaller loan portfolios as shown at
right. Banks in Indiana and Michigan with ROEs greater than 16% have consistently held far
more loans as a percentage of assets than lower ROE institutions.
So why dont all institutions maintain high loan-to-asset ratios to maximize
returns? In most cases the answer is self-imposed policy limits. Policy limits should be
set based on a cost/benefit analysis. Restrictive policies based on loans to deposits or
mandating the sale of fixed-rate loans may result in a lower risk profile, but not without
cost. Policy limits that reduce loan-to-asset ratios will also reduce profitability.
For most institutions, the quickest and easiest way to increase loan-to-asset levels
and profitability is adding a fixed-rate mortgage portfolio. Too often, institutions with
low loan concentrations actively sell fixed-rate mortgage production. Instead of being
sold, these mortgages could be funded with excess liquidity to boost loans to assets and
profitability. The big question is how to do this without drastically increasing risk.

A combination of long-term FHLBI funding and existing
liquidity can prudently be used to fund fixed-rate mortgages. This use of long-term and
short-term funds is often referred to as a barbell strategy. Short-term liquidity funds
the mortgages the first few years, and long-term FHLBI borrowings fund the balance.
Barbell funding matches risk
Barbell funding strategies are extremely flexible. The funding structure can be
customized to match the interest rate risk objective. For example, an institution may be
averse to adding fixed-rate mortgages longer than five-year balloons. Barbell funding can
be used with longer term mortgages to create an interest rate risk profile similar to
five-year balloons. This is accomplished by funding the first five years of the
mortgages maturities with existing liquidity and the remaining maturities with
long-term FHLBI borrowings. Consider the case of current 15 year mortgage production.
During early March 2000, the market rate for 15 year mortgages was approximately 8.25%.
While infinite barbell funding strategies are possible, a structure of 70% liquidity (to
fund the first five years) and 30% six- and seven-year FHLBI borrowings could be used.
Assuming the liquidity was previously invested in fed funds or short-term securities at
5.75% and the FHLBI borrowing cost was 7.30%, the weighted average funding cost would be
6.22% (the liquidity funding cost is an opportunity cost). In other words, the strategy
would produce a 203 basis point spread at the start (8.25% - 6.22%). While the strategy
looks good initially, how would it affect the institutions risk?
If interest rates were to rise, long-term funding would provide a significant hedge.
While only a fraction of the funding is fixed rate (30%), there is enough to anchor the
overall cost of funds through most rate fluctuations. The cost of funds can only change
70% of any rate change, since 30% of the cost is fixed. This allows the barbell strategy
to sustain nearly a 3% rate shock and still maintain a positive spread. Increasing the
percentage of long-term funding provides even greater protection against rising interest
rates. Of course, the cost of this protection is a higher initial funding cost and a lower
initial spread. Also, increasing the percentage of fixed rate funding reduces the
protection against the risk of falling interest rates proportionately.
If interest rates were to fall, the liquidity portion of the funding strategy would
result in a wider spread. An immediate 2% drop in rates would hypothetically widen the
spread to 343 basis points. Unfortunately, this spread would be short-lived since
prepayments would accelerate. However, managing prepayments is a strength of barbell
strategies. Incorporating only 30% fixed funding helps prevent prepayments from reducing
the loan balance below the funding level.
Effect on other risks modest
The barbell funding strategy also has an impact on both credit and liquidity risks. The
strategy results in a modest increase in both credit risk and leverage. In effect, the
strategy substitutes 50% risk-weight mortgages for 20% risk-weight fed funds or
securities. Risk assets will be increased by the strategy. However, since conforming
Midwestern mortgages historically have exhibited very high credit quality, the actual
increase in credit risk is probably slight.
The barbell strategy also results in balance sheet growth to the extent that FHLBI
borrowings are incorporated. In the example, the institution would grow assets $300,000
for every million dollars of new mortgages funded, increasing leverage. Since higher
yielding loans replace securities, this modest increase in leverage would improve ROE
without a corresponding deterioration in ROA.
| Liquidity change to fund $1M in mortgages |
|
Gain in FHLBI borrowing capacity |
|
$800,000 |
|
Reduction in fed funds or securities |
|
-700,000 |
New
FHLBI borrowings
|
|
-300,000
|
| Overall change in liquidity |
|
-200,000 |
Finally, the strategy would have a modest impact on liquidity risk.
While fed funds would be reduced and FHLBI borrowing capacity would be used, the new
mortgages could be pledged for future borrowings. The table below shows the net impact on
overall liquidity.
For every $1 million in market value of new mortgages, liquidity would be reduced by
only $200,000. This illustrates a very important point. From a liquidity perspective, not
all loans are created equal. When institutions add assets that can be pledged for new
FHLBI borrowings (such as mortgages), liquidity is only reduced slightly. For this reason,
mortgages can be used to boost the loan-to-asset ratio without a significant increase in
liquidity risk.
Copyright 2000, Federal
Home Loan Bank of Indianapolis.
Send comments to Financial Communications, Federal Home Loan Bank, PO
Box 60, Indianapolis, IN 46206.
This article has been presented for educational purposes only. The FHLBI is not a
financial or investment advisor. It is solely the reader's responsibility to evaluate the
risk and merits of any funding strategy or business proposal.
Copyright 2000, Federal Home
Loan Bank of Indianapolis
|